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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 After declaring a mistrial, the District Court dismissed 
Laureen Bull’s state-law employment discrimination case as a 
sanction for failing to produce originals of certain medical 
notes requested by United Parcel Service.  Bull maintains that 
the District Court abused its discretion by ordering this 
sanction.  We agree and will reverse and remand for retrial.       
       
I. 
A. 
 Our review is fact-intensive.  However, the basic 
contours of the case can be summarized as follows.  Bull, a 
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part-time employee since 1986, injured her neck and shoulder 
on the job in late December 2005.  Though she promptly 
reported the incident and requested medical attention the 
following day, there was a two-week delay before she had 
access to a company doctor.  She also alleges a number of 
instances in which her supervisors ignored, downplayed and 
misrepresented her injury to superiors.   
 
 The company doctor diagnosed her with contusions 
and strains to her shoulder and neck, and restricted her lifting 
to twenty-five pounds.  She was referred to an orthopedic 
specialist who lowered the lifting restriction to twenty 
pounds.  She was also given physical therapy for 
approximately two months.  UPS placed her on a temporary 
work assignment that did not involve lifting, but at the end of 
the 29-day assignment she stopped working and began 
receiving workers’ compensation.  On March 29, 2006, the 
orthopedic specialist opined that—though Bull was only 70 
percent recovered—she had reached maximum medical 
improvement.  The doctor restricted her overhead lifting to 10 
pounds, but did not mention other types of lifting.   
 
 Bull returned to work and presented the specialist’s 
note.  She received a new work assignment, but after five 
days her new supervisor told her that her medical restrictions 
made it impossible for UPS to continue assigning work to her.  
UPS advised her to seek permanent disability.   
 
B. 
  Bull wished to be reinstated and asked her union 
representative for help.  The representative advised her to get 
a second opinion from her own doctor.  Through her doctor’s 
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referral, another orthopedic specialist, Dr. Farber, examined 
her on June 13, 2006.  Farber gave her a note that said among 
other things:  “patient is capable of lifting 50 pounds or 
more.”  D.C. No. 2-07-cv-02291, ECF No. 18-14, 10.  The 
collective bargaining agreement requires that employees be 
capable of lifting 70 pounds.  Bull faxed the note to the union 
representative who, in turn, faxed it to UPS.  UPS, however, 
found numerous inconsistencies with the note, and told this to 
the union representative.1  Bull’s union representative then 
advised Bull to get another note, and to get more information 
to satisfy UPS’s issues.  Bull called Dr. Farber’s office and 
requested another note.  She then faxed a second note from 
Dr. Farber’s office, dated August 14, 2006.  UPS also found 
multiple problems with the second note.2
                                              
1 UPS found that the Farber note, dated June 13, 2006, listed 
conflicting dates and provided contradictory answers on 
whether the medical condition was work related.  Moreover, 
the note ambiguously stated that Bull could lift “50 pounds or 
more.”  UPS also deemed other portions of the note as 
illegible and observed that part of the note was cut off.  ECF 
No. 18-1, 14-15.   
  These two notes 
from Dr. Farber’s office have become central to this appeal.   
 
2 UPS asserts that the August 14, 2006 Farber note had 
numerous problems, including:  inconsistent dates; a 
signature differs from the June note; inconsistent answers on 
the issue of whether the medical condition was work-related; 
and, an ambiguous instruction that “Patient is not able to lift 
over 70 pounds.”  The note was also cut off at the bottom.  
Finally, there were portions of the note that were illegible.  
ECF No. 18-1, 16-19. 
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 On September 27, 2006, UPS sent a letter to Bull’s 
union representative, saying in part: 
 
As you know, we received two 
notes from Dr. Farber’s office 
regarding Ms. Bull’s ability to 
return to work; both notes (dated 
June 13, 2006 and August 14, 
2006) indicate restricted duty. . . . 
The Company also requests that 
Ms. Bull produce the original 
notes from Dr. Farber’s office due 
to the fact that the notes received 
to date are blurry and in some 
cases illegible. 
 
ECF No. 18-15, 9.   The representative contacted Bull, and 
requested again a new doctor’s note and more information.  
Bull never responded.  Instead, she filed a Workers’ 
Compensation lawsuit and contacted the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission.  She then filed the instant claim in 
April 2007.  During discovery, Bull turned over new copies 
of the Farber notes to UPS in response to their general 
discovery requests.   
C. 
 At the March 2010 trial, during Bull’s direct 
examination, her counsel sought to introduce copies of the 
June 13, 2006 note from Dr. Farber.  UPS objected on the 
basis of best evidence.  During the sidebar that followed, the 
District Court asked Bull’s attorney where the original June 
13, 2006 note from Dr. Farber was.  He responded:  “we don’t 
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have - - it doesn’t exist any more.  All we have is a copy.”  
ECF No. 56-4, 21:24-25.  He also pointed out that Dr. Farber 
had authenticated the note.  UPS responded that they had 
“documented letters asking for the originals,” and that, during 
this litigation, “we have asked for the originals, and we have 
never seen them.”  Id. at 23:4-5, 23:18-19.  The District Court 
ultimately decided to overrule UPS’s objections, concluding 
that the argument against admission went to the weight of the 
evidence, rather than its authenticity. 
 
 Moments later, as Bull’s counsel was about to request 
that the note be admitted into evidence, the District Court 
interrupted and said to Bull in open court:  “Well, before we 
do that:  Where’s the original of this note?”  She answered:  
“The original note is in my home. . . .”  Id. at 28:6.  Surprised 
by his client’s response, Bull’s counsel immediately said:   
 
Your honor, I understand what 
she just said.  I’ve been asking her 
for the originals since the very 
beginning when Mr. Bissinger 
[UPS’s counsel] has been asking 
me for the originals.  She just kept 
telling me that she doesn’t have 
them, she’s looked for them but 
she doesn’t - - can’t find those 
notes anymore, they don’t exist 
any more.3
                                              
3 In an affidavit accompanying Bull’s response to UPS’s 
motion for sanctions, counsel revisits this statement.  He says:  
“When queried as to original Farber medical notes, Ms. Bull 
indicated that she was unable to locate them and believed 
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Id. at 28:12-17.  A few moments later, after a brief sidebar, 
Bull’s attorney sought to clarify her statement.  The following 
exchange occurred in open court. 
 
Q. Laureen, I understood – 
have you looked for the original?   
Have you actually been able to 
find the original note? 
 
A. I have looked for the 
original note.  Many things going 
on in my life with the paperwork, 
and the sale—got damage to my 
apartment.  I  can try to find this 
note. 
 
                                                                                                     
they may have been lost due to flooding in her home.”  ECF 
No. 58-1, 2.  He, then, goes on to say:  “The Court should be 
aware that this is undersigned counsel’s recollection of what 
transpired in 2007, but not Ms. Bull’s.  Ms. Bull has recently 
advised her counsel that she does not recall being asked by 
undersigned for the original Farber medical notes and that she 
would have conducted a search for these documents back in 
2007 is [sic] she had been required to do so.”  Id.  Moreover, 
at oral argument, Bull’s counsel stated emphatically that Bull 
did not lie about possessing these documents.  Therefore, 
without a finding by the District Court, or indeed any 
testimony from Bull on this topic, we can neither speculate 
upon what Bull understood or intended with regard to the 
production of the Farber note originals, nor whether her 
responses were credible. 
8 
 
Q. Have I asked you to look 
for the original? 
 
The Court: Well, wait a minute. 
Wait a minute.  In response to my 
question, you said the original 
was at your home.  There was no 
hesitation.   
 
The Witness: Correct.   
 
The Court:    Is the original of 
that note at your home? 
 
The Witness:   It should be. 
 
The Court: As your attorney 
stated, this case has been  going 
on for years.  There were years of 
discovery.  This note was asked 
for.  Is there some reason - - have 
you made a search  for it 
previously?   
 
The Witness: No, sir. 
 
Id. at 30:3-21.  In the sidebar that followed, the District Court 
questioned counsel for Bull and UPS on the appropriate 
response to this revelation.  UPS advocated excluding the 
originals and any copies other than those originally faxed to 
them by the union, specifically requesting that the jury be 
permitted to see only the document presented to UPS.  The 
District Court brushed aside UPS’s suggestions and instead 
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decided to declare a mistrial and invited UPS to file a motion 
for sanctions.   
 
 Bull sent the original June 13 and August 14 notes 
from Dr. Farber to the District Court five days after the 
mistrial.  UPS filed a motion for sanctions, and in October 
2010 the District Court ordered the case dismissed with 
prejudice to sanction Bull’s conduct.  This appeal followed.   
 
II. 
A. 
 The District Court ruled that Bull’s failure to produce 
originals of the medical notes was spoliation and it invoked 
its inherent authority to order the case dismissed with 
prejudice as a sanction.  See Schmid v. Milwakee Elec. Tool 
Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1994).4
 
  Two questions arise:  
first, generally, whether the production of facsimiles and 
copies—in place of the originals—can be considered 
spoliation; and, second, whether Bull’s specific acts or 
omissions in this case provided a reasonable basis to rule that 
she spoliated evidence, warranting dismissal with prejudice.  
Sanctions for spoliation of evidence are reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc., 489 
F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 2007).      
B. 
                                              
4 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
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 We first look at whether, generally, failing to produce 
original documents can be considered spoliation.  Spoliation 
is usually referenced in instances where evidence has been 
altered or destroyed.  See Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus 
Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Spoliation occurs 
when evidence is destroyed or altered, or when a party fails to 
preserve evidence in instances where litigation is pending or 
reasonably foreseeable.).  We have described it more broadly.  
For instance, in a context not involving a mistrial or 
dismissal, but while discussing a district court’s decision to 
instruct the jury with an adverse inference for spoliation, we 
said the following: 
 
When the contents of a document 
are relevant to an issue in a case, 
the trier of fact generally may 
receive the fact of the document's 
nonproduction or destruction as 
evidence that the party that has 
prevented production did so out of 
the well-founded fear that the 
contents would harm him.  Gumbs 
v. International Harvester, Inc., 
718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir.1983); 
United States v. Cherkasky Meat 
Co., 259 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1958). 
 
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 
(3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).  Indeed, a party’s failure to 
produce a document can have the same practical effect as 
destroying it and we reaffirm that, under certain 
circumstances, nonproduction of evidence is rightfully 
characterized as spoliation. 
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 Here, though Bull failed to produce the originals, she 
did provide UPS with facsimiles and photocopies of the 
documents.  The District Court concluded that, in spite of 
producing copies, Bull’s conduct was spoliation because, 
although UPS had not requested a forensic analysis of the 
originals, such tests might have yielded information directly 
relevant to the question of whether the documents were 
authentic.  Such an analysis might not be possible on just 
copies.  We are persuaded that, in some instances, original 
documents might yield relevant evidence that is simply not 
available from copies.  As a result, we conclude with the 
District Court that—theoretically—producing copies in 
instances where the originals have been requested may 
constitute spoliation if it would prevent discovering critical 
information.  With that said, we reach a very different 
conclusion when we turn to the question of whether spoliation 
occurred here.   
 
C. 
 Spoliation occurs where:  the evidence was in the 
party’s control; the evidence is relevant to the claims or 
defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or 
withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the 
evidence was reasonably foreseeable to the party.  Id. 5
                                              
5 The District Court essentially merged its deliberation on 
spoliation with its analysis of spoliation sanctions.  Though 
there is some overlap between the two, there are distinctive 
elements of each.  We are focusing upon the spoliation 
analysis first.  However, we note that the sanctions analysis 
includes the following factors: “(1) the degree of fault of the 
   Two 
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of these factors pose little controversy in this case.  There is 
no question that the documents were in Bull’s control since 
she admitted this on the stand and produced the documents 
five days after the District Court declared the mistrial.  We 
also have no doubt that the Farber notes were relevant to both 
the claims and defenses of this case since the notes discuss a 
central issue in this case:  Bull’s capacity to work.  The 
remaining factors, though, merit closer attention. 
 
D. 
 With regard to whether Bull intentionally withheld the 
original notes from Dr. Farber’s office, the District Court 
summarized the facts upon which it made its decision:  
  
Although Plaintiff would have 
this Court believe that originals of 
the documents in question were 
never requested during discovery, 
that contention is disingenuous in 
light of the record, which 
documents that at least as early as 
September 27, 2006, Defendant 
UPS had requested “that Ms. Bull 
produce the original notes from 
Dr. Farber’s office . . . .”  
                                                                                                     
party who altered or destroyed the evidence; (2) the degree of 
prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether 
there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness 
to the opposing party, and, where the offending party is 
seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in 
the future.”  Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79.   
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The District Court also said “despite numerous requests, both 
formal and informal, to produce the disputed documents, 
Plaintiff never responded.”  As a result, the District Court 
concluded that:  
 
Common sense and 
reasonableness in light of this 
record, and the numerous and 
repeated references to the fact that 
Plaintiff never accounted for the 
absence of the originals, point to 
nothing less than purposeful 
withholding of critical evidence 
that can not [sic] be countenanced 
or overlooked by this Court.   
 
Although a District Court has discretion to draw inferences 
from the record on a party’s intent, it strays beyond the 
bounds of its discretion when, as here, there is no factual 
basis to do so.  The central problem is that the District Court 
accepted, without any critical examination, 
misrepresentations of the record promulgated by UPS. 
 
 We start with the District Court’s foundational 
premise:  UPS hounded Bull for the originals over the course 
of years, but got no response.6
                                              
6 UPS misstated as fact the following to the District Court:  
“We have documented letters asking for the originals.”  ECF 
No. 56-4, 23:4-5.  “I have never been able to get the originals 
because they won’t give them to me. . . .”  Id. at 24:7-9.  “I 
sent the trial subpoena.  It was very clear I want the originals 
  To the contrary, we count a 
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total of only two requests by UPS for the original documents 
in the entire span of this case—dating back to pre-litigation 
communications—and neither of these inquiries were 
discovery requests.7
 
   
 The first communication was UPS’s September 27, 
2006, pre-litigation letter requesting the originals.  This letter 
was addressed to Bull’s union representative, not Bull.  UPS 
dismisses the distinction because—it says—they have sworn 
testimony from the union representative that he told Bull that 
UPS wanted the originals.  The representative made no such 
statement.  He only requested that Bull provide new notes, 
new information, or maybe better or clearer copies.8
                                                                                                     
of the notes.  Why - -  and we have Rule 26, we have all of 
these things, and I still don’t have it, and now we’re three 
days into trial.”  Id. at 37:22-25.  “I don’t know what to do 
here, Judge.  We go through three days of trial.  I asked for 
the originals notes.  I sent a valid subpoena.  She apparently 
has had them for three years, four years.”  Id. at 45:23-46:1.   
  The 
  
7 UPS’s request for production of documents in this case 
asked for “copies of the documents described herein . . . .”  It 
did not request originals of these documents. 
 
8 The full text of this portion of the Cherney deposition is as 
follows: 
   
Q.   Did you ask or attempt to get better 
copies of the notes for UPS in response to 
[UPS’s request]?   
A. Yes, I did. 
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union representative knew that UPS wanted the originals, but 
we have no evidence that Bull knew, and we do not have any 
basis to impute the union representative’s knowledge of 
UPS’s request to Bull. 
   
 It does not end there, however.  UPS also repeatedly 
stresses that, from the beginning of discovery, Bull had the 
September 27 letter from UPS.  The implication is that Bull 
knew about this pre-litigation request for the originals at least 
by the early phase of this litigation.  Although it may be 
                                                                                                     
Q. Do you recall what you did response to 
that? 
A. Can you repeat the question? 
Q. Sure.  I asked you what did you do to get 
better  copies of the notes or words to that 
effect.  You  said yes you  did.  I’m asking did 
you go to Ms. Bull and ask her to get 
something, did you go to  Dr. Farber?  What 
did you do? 
A.   I had conversations with Laureen in 
effect that  there was issues with ambiguities 
with the note  and that to further clarify it, to get 
notes that - -  a note that would release her back 
to full duty. 
Q.   Did you talk to her about the fact that the 
notes  in some cases were - - or the company 
felt that  there was some illegible parts of 
the notes or  that they were blurry and we 
needed clearer copies? 
A. Yes. 
 
Robert Cherney Deposition, 57:14-58:12 (emphasis added). 
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technically accurate to say that the letter was in Bull’s 
constructive possession, UPS fails to note that it produced the 
letter in response to Bull’s general discovery request.  
Producing such a letter to Bull in response to her general 
requests for documents is not the same thing as presenting 
Bull with a specific discovery request for the original notes 
from Dr. Farber’s office.  Moreover, we would expect that—
had UPS intended this letter to result in Bull turning over the 
original notes in question—it would have made at least some 
attempt to pursue their production when they did not 
materialize.  Yet, UPS never raised the nonproduction of the 
originals in a motion to compel, or in any other 
communication.  As a result, any assertion that the pre-
litigation letter of September 27, 2006 to the union 
representative put Bull on notice of UPS’s request for 
originals fails.   
 
 UPS’s second request for the originals came on March 
3, 2010—five days before trial commenced—in the form of 
an email.  Though UPS refers to it as a trial subpoena, the 
District Court noted that it did not meet the requirements of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.  We agree.  Indeed, there is no evidence 
that the document that UPS calls a subpoena was issued by 
the court.  As such, given that discovery was closed and that 
the email is not a subpoena, we cannot treat this 
communication as anything more than a reminder to Bull’s 
counsel that, at trial, the best evidence rule would apply to the 
notes from Dr. Farber’s office.  Moreover, the record does not 
contain any evidence that Bull was ever aware of this email.  
Therefore, like the September 27, 2006 letter, the email fails 
to provide support for an inference that Bull knew of UPS’s 
request and still inadvertently or intentionally withheld the 
original notes from them.  
17 
 
 
 We conclude from this that the District Court was 
flatly wrong when it declared that UPS made “multiple” 
requests of Bull for the original notes.  We must also 
conclude that any inference of Bull’s intent to obstinately 
withhold the originals also fails for a lack of any factual 
foundation that she actually knew UPS wanted them.   
 
 The District Court also makes much of UPS’s 
challenge to the authenticity of the Farber notes in its motion 
for summary judgment, in a pretrial motion, and during its 
opening argument.  It infers that Bull should have understood 
from UPS’s challenge to the authenticity of the notes that 
UPS wanted and needed the originals.  However, these, alone, 
imply no such thing.  It is largely counsel’s role to assess 
which evidence best serves the case.  It was up to UPS’s 
counsel to press for the originals if it needed them, and it was 
up to Bull’s counsel to diligently investigate all possible 
sources for the originals if he needed them to rebut the 
argument.  If neither counsel pressed Bull for the originals to 
make their case, we cannot impute to Bull a sophisticated 
knowledge of trial strategy.  Indeed, it is obvious from UPS’s 
arguments at sidebar that it was content to try the case with 
the copies.  Moreover, UPS’s challenges to the notes’ 
authenticity were largely confined to information that was 
readily available on the note copies.  Bull, and her counsel for 
that matter, had no reason to place a high priority on locating 
the original notes.9
                                              
9 See supra notes 1 and 2. 
  Therefore, without anything else, Bull 
could not be deemed to be “on notice” that UPS wanted or 
needed the originals merely from their authenticity argument.   
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 Moving beyond UPS’s requests for originals, the 
District Court references a statement made by Bull’s counsel 
at trial as a basis to infer her intent.  In the instant after Bull 
revealed that the original notes from Dr. Farber’s office were 
likely in her possession, her counsel said:  
 
Your honor, I understand what 
she just said.  I’ve been asking her 
for the originals since the very 
beginning when Mr. Bissinger 
[UPS’s counsel] has been asking 
me for the originals.  She just kept 
telling me that she doesn’t have 
them, she’s looked for them but 
she doesn’t - - can’t find those 
notes anymore, they don’t exist 
any more [sic].  
  
 
ECF No. 56-4, 28:12-17.  Bull disputes any memory of this 
request, and her attorney has moved away from saying that he 
made multiple requests of Bull.10
 
  Yet, even if we accept 
counsel’s version of events as told at trial, we do not see how 
this exchange between counsel and client can be used to 
ground a conclusion that Bull committed, as the District 
Court said, “flagrant violations of the most basic code of 
judicial propriety and honest dealing.”  Absent the backdrop 
of UPS’s unsubstantiated portrayal of Bull as an obstinate 
stonewaller, this conclusion is dramatically overblown.   
                                              
10 See supra note 3.  
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 This is not to say that we take Bull’s failure to turn 
over the originals to her counsel lightly.  To be sure, Bull put 
her counsel in a terrible position.   Her counsel represented in 
a side-bar to the District Court—moments before her open-
court revelation—that “we don’t have  - - it [the Farber note 
original] doesn’t exist any more. All we have is a copy.”  
ECF No. 56-4, 21:24-25.  He also unwittingly violated the 
best evidence rule.  Fed. R. Evid. 1002.  There is no question 
that the late revelation concerning the originals had impacts.   
 
 The key issue, however, is whether the discrepancy 
between her statements (if in fact there is a discrepancy) was 
an intentional misrepresentation or—as her counsel insists—
inadvertence.   The record does not answer this question.  To 
be sure, the District Court was remiss in its failure to examine 
this issue more closely and in its failure to make findings of 
fact on inadvertence and misrepresentation.  Yet, mindful that 
it is UPS’s burden to prove Bull’s bad faith conduct, there are 
strong reasons favoring a presumption of inadvertence.  
 
 Counsel attempted to examine Bull on the record 
before the mistrial was declared to get her explanation for her 
late revelation, but the District Court inexplicably would not 
allow it.11
                                              
11 Bull’s counsel said at sidebar:   
  There is no evidence that either Bull or her 
 
Bull’s Counsel:  I would like to pursue [the reason for Bull 
not searching for the Farber notes] with Ms. - - and see ifthere 
can be a clarification with her that you can ask her questions 
and she can explain.  You asked her a question and she gave 
you a one-word response, okay? Maybe there’s more to it that 
would clarify.” 
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counsel wished to be anything less than candid about this 
topic.  They were simply prevented from doing so by the 
District Court who passed up the opportunity to take 
testimony and make findings of fact.  Moreover, Bull’s 
counsel stated emphatically in oral argument that Bull did not 
lie to him about the originals, seemingly ruling out bad faith.  
Since the entire case for Bull’s bad faith seems to rest on 
counsel’s words, we must take all of his words on the topic 
into account, including these.  Moreover, even if Bull did 
obfuscate on the request from her attorney (a conclusion that 
ignores Bull’s counsel’s statements, and the later 
representations made by Bull to her counsel), there is still no 
evidence that Bull knew UPS wanted the originals, since she 
had already produced copies.  In light of UPS’s utter failure 
to produce any evidence of its own to ground the conclusion 
that Bull acted in bad faith, all of this supports abiding by a 
presumption of inadvertence. 
 
 We must keep in mind that at issue is whether the 
District Court was reasonable in ruling that Bull’s late 
revelation about the existence of the originals was a “flagrant 
violation” and that there is: 
 
 [N]o plausible explanation other 
than Plaintiff’s misconduct that 
explains the withholding of the 
original Farber notes.  Despite 
                                                                                                     
 
The Court:  No, she gave me a one-word response. Yes, I 
have it, it’s at home, and “I’ve never even tried to find it.” 
   
ECF No. 56-4, 42:6-13.   
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numerous requests both formal 
and informal, to produce the 
disputed documents, Plaintiff 
never responded.  
  
On this point, our review of the record has left us with a very 
different set of conclusions from the District Court.  First, we 
do not see any basis for the District Court’s characterization 
of UPS as persistently hounding Bull for the originals.  
Indeed, it did not.  Second, as a result of this, there is not one 
instance in which we can verify that Bull actually knew that 
UPS wanted the original notes.  Third, lacking such evidence 
there is no basis to characterize Bull as one who lied or 
obfuscated to prevail in her attempt to intentionally withhold 
the originals.  We conclude from all of this that the District 
Court abused its discretion in ruling that, within its spoliation 
analysis, Bull intentionally withheld the original documents 
from UPS. 
 
E. 
 We turn, finally, to the issue of whether Bull had a 
foreseeable duty to preserve and turn over the originals of the 
notes from Dr. Farber’s office.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit said that the question of reasonable 
foreseeability is a “flexible fact-specific standard that allows 
a district court to exercise the discretion necessary to confront 
the myriad factual situations inherent in the spoliation 
inquiry.”  Micron Technology, Inc., 645 F.3d at 1320.  Here, 
the District Court ruled that “it is hard to imagine evidence 
that could have been more . . . foreseeable.”  We conclude 
that the District Court was within its discretion when it 
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determined that there was a foreseeable duty here, but we 
have some reservations.  
 
 The record is scattered with support for the District 
Court’s conclusion.  1.)  Bull initiated both an EEOC 
proceeding and the instant litigation within a year of UPS’s 
employment action.  2.)  Bull was aware that she and UPS 
fundamentally disagreed on the meaning of the notes from 
Dr. Farber’s office.  3.)  Though she denies it, her counsel 
says that—on at least one occasion—he asked her for the 
originals.  4.)  Both UPS’s motion for summary judgment and 
a pre-trial motion mention the fact that UPS had never seen 
the originals.  UPS also raised this fact in its opening 
argument.  5.) Finally, Bull had a duty under Rule 1002 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to produce the original documents 
before the notes could be introduced into evidence at trial.    
 
 With that said, the duty issue is not so clear cut.  We 
lack evidence that counsel for either party made any 
appreciable effort to induce Bull to search for and produce the 
original Farber notes.  Moreover, it is clear that UPS’s 
challenge to the authenticity of the notes rested upon 
information that was available on the copies of the 
documents.  This leads us to wonder whether a lay-person 
like Bull, ignorant of the Rules of Evidence, might have 
concluded that copies of the notes were sufficient.   
 
 Nonetheless, the question before us is not whether a 
particular scenario is possible, but rather whether the duty 
was objectively foreseeable.  Under the circumstances of this 
case, we will assume that the District Court acted within its 
discretion in determining that the litigation and the future 
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need to provide access to the original notes from Dr. Farber’s 
office were foreseeable.12
F. 
  
                                              
12 This highlights a growing concern for us that is not directly 
implicated in this case.  As electronic document technology 
progresses, the concept of an “original” document is 
becoming more abstract.  Moving from the more easily 
distinguishable photocopy or facsimile to documents created, 
transmitted and stored in an electronic form means that it will 
be increasingly difficult to ascertain where the boundary of an 
objectively reasonable duty to preserve such documents lies.  
There are—and increasingly will be—circumstances in which 
the foreseeability of a duty to preserve the information 
contained in a particular document is distinguishable—under 
an objective analysis—from the need to preserve that 
information in its “original” form or format.  Indeed, arriving 
at a common understanding of what an “original” is in this 
context is challenging enough.  Although it does, and always 
will rest with the courts to preserve the distinction between an 
objectively foreseeable duty and actual knowledge of such a 
duty, there is a concomitant obligation that counsel must 
assume to clearly and precisely articulate the need for parties 
to search for, maintain, and—where necessary—produce 
“original” or source documents.  This case gives us one more 
opportunity to highlight our position that clarity in 
communications from counsel that establish a record of a 
party’s actual knowledge of this duty will ensure that this 
technology-driven issue does not consume an unduly large 
portion of the court’s attention in future litigation.  
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 In summarizing the Brewer spoliation factors, we 
conclude that the District Court was within its discretion in 
determining that Bull had the original notes from Dr. Farber’s 
office in her possession, that these documents were relevant 
to the case’s claims and defenses, and we will assume that she 
had a reasonably foreseeable duty to preserve and—when 
requested—turn-over these documents.  Yet, we conclude that 
the District Court abused its discretion in determining that 
Bull intentionally withheld these documents from UPS.   
 
 In Brewer we discussed the connection between a 
finding of sanctionable spoliation and a ruling on bad faith, 
stating the following:  
 
For the [spoliation] rule to apply . 
. . it must appear that there has 
been an actual suppression or 
withholding of the evidence. No 
unfavorable inference arises when 
the circumstances indicate that 
the document or article in 
question has been lost or 
accidentally destroyed, or where 
the failure to produce it is 
otherwise properly accounted for. 
See generally 31A C.J.S. 
Evidence § 156(2); 29 Am.Jur.2d 
Evidence § 177 (“Such a 
presumption or inference arises, 
however, only when the spoliation 
or destruction [of evidence] was 
intentional, and indicates fraud 
and a desire to suppress the truth, 
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and it does not arise where the 
destruction was a matter of 
routine with no fraudulent 
intent.”). 
 
Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334 (emphasis added).  Therefore, a 
finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination.  
This only makes sense, since spoliation of documents that are 
merely withheld, but not destroyed, requires evidence that the 
documents are actually withheld, rather than—for instance—
misplaced.  Withholding requires intent.13
 
 
 As a result, we must be convinced that the District 
Court, on sufficient evidence, found that Bull intended to 
actually withhold the original documents from UPS before we 
can conclude that sanctionable spoliation occurred.  There is 
no such finding of record here.  As we have concluded that 
the District Court abused its discretion in ruling that Bull 
acted in bad faith, we must rule that the District Court abused 
its discretion in determining that Bull committed sanctionable 
spoliation.  Accordingly, the District Court’s sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice, which is grounded in the conclusion 
that Bull spoliated evidence, is also an abuse of discretion.  
 
III. 
                                              
13 We note that the verb “withhold” is defined as “To keep 
from doing something, to keep in check or under restraint; to 
hold back, restrain.”  Oxford English Dictionary.  
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/229665?redirectedFrom=wit
hhold#eid, last viewed December 5, 2011.  It inherently 
expresses an intentional act.   
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A. 
 Our decision to reverse the District Court’s ruling on 
spoliation eliminates the need for a specific review of the 
District Court’s sanction of a dismissal with prejudice, since 
it arose from its determination that Bull spoliated evidence.  
Yet, the District Court’s rationale for the sanction contained 
in its opinion differs markedly from its analysis when it 
granted the mistrial and invited a motion for sanctions.  When 
it granted the mistrial, the District Court based its decision on 
a perceived discovery violation that it characterized as 
spoliation.  In its opinion it retreats from that basis and 
instead relies on its inherent power to sanction.  The inherent 
power of the District Court to sanction parties’ conduct is, of 
course, not limited to instances of spoliation.  Therefore, in an 
abundance of caution, we will review the record to ascertain 
whether the circumstances of this case, generally construed, 
provide any basis on which the District Court could 
substantiate dismissing the case with prejudice.  
  
 Generally, “[w]hile we defer to the District Court's 
discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in 
limited circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor 
of reaching a decision on the merits.”  Emerson v. Thiel 
College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  Dismissals with 
prejudice are “drastic sanctions.”  Poulis v. State Farm Fire 
and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir. 1984).  Moreover, 
district courts ordinarily balance six factors in assessing the 
propriety of an involuntary dismissal with prejudice:  “(1) the 
party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) willfulness or bad 
faith; (5) the availability of alternative sanctions; and (6) the 
merit of the claim or defense.”  Doe v. Megless,  654 F.3d 
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404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).  As 
the District Court acknowledged, some of the Poulis factors 
duplicate the spoliation analysis.  Nonetheless, we will review 
each one separately.      
 
B. 
 We begin by looking at Bull’s personal responsibility 
for withholding these documents.  As we noted earlier, the 
District Court concluded that there is: 
 
[N]o plausible explanation other 
than Plaintiff’s misconduct that 
explains the withholding of the 
original Farber notes.  Despite 
numerous requests, both formal 
and informal, to produce the 
disputed documents, Plaintiff 
never responded. 
 
As we already detailed, however, the District Court’s 
inference that Bull intentionally withheld documents is not 
grounded in the record.  Although Rule 1002 placed 
responsibility for producing the originals with Bull and her 
counsel, negligence remains a reasonable explanation for 
everything that happened.  The same can also be said for her 
possible misrepresentation of the documents’ whereabouts to 
her attorney.  The record simply does not have evidence, nor 
a factual finding supporting bad faith intent.  Moreover, had 
the District Court found bad faith conduct on this evidence, it 
would have clearly erred.  This leads us to conclude that, 
though the personal responsibility factor of the Poulis 
analysis must weigh against Bull because of the duty she had 
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under Rule 1002, this factor cannot be given great weight 
because there is neither evidence of, nor a finding that she 
intended to withhold the documents. 
 
C. 
 The District Court concluded that the next factor, 
prejudice, also weighed heavily in favor of dismissal.  It said: 
 
Had Defendant been able to prove 
that the document was tampered 
with, that would obviously have 
had significant bearing on the 
case.  The fact that [UPS] could 
not conduct forensic analysis on 
the original was certainly 
prejudicial, even if the outcome of 
such an analysis remains 
unknown.   
 
It also ruled that this, combined with the costs of trial 
preparation and UPS’s inability to account for the originals in 
the development of its trial strategy, resulted in “significant 
prejudice.”  
  
  Examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of 
evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or 
the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs 
imposed on the opposing party.” Scarborough v. Eubanks, 
747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).  We have also said:  
‘“prejudice’ for the purpose of Poulis analysis does not mean 
‘irremediable harm,’ the burden imposed by impeding a 
party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial 
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strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.”  Ware v. Rodale Press, 
Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).    
 
 Certainly, the lack of access, coupled with UPS’s 
unreimburseable costs of preparing for trial, and the 
disclosure of UPS’s trial strategy all support the District 
Court’s use of its discretion in ruling that UPS suffered 
prejudice.  For this reason, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion here.   
 
 Again, however, we are dubious about the District 
Court’s characterization of the prejudice as “severe” and 
“irreparable,” since we do not know the probative value of the 
originals (as compared to the copies) and are puzzled by 
UPS’s lackadaisical effort in obtaining them—given how 
critical they now say they were to their case. 
 
D. 
 
 With regard to dilatoriness, the District Court ruled 
that it “weighs extremely against Plaintiff.”  Yet, as we 
addressed above, there is no evidence that Bull was ever 
aware that UPS specifically requested the Farber note 
originals.  Moreover, the first request that UPS made for the 
documents during the litigation was literally on the eve of 
trial.  As a result, we do not find any reasonable basis for the 
conclusion that Bull was dilatory as to the production of the 
originals to UPS.   
 
 With regard to her attorney, we must rely on counsel’s 
representations that the delay between his own request for the 
original documents and her production of them five days after 
mistrial was due to inadvertence or misunderstanding.  On 
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this basis, we cannot characterize her conduct as dilatory 
because there is no evidence of a willful delay. 
 
E. 
 The fourth factor, bad faith, already has been discussed 
in detail above.  Suffice to say, in spite of the District Court’s 
strong, negative characterization of Bull on this element, we 
conclude that there is not a reasonable basis in the record to 
conclude that she willfully withheld the documents or that her 
conduct was in bad faith.   
 
F. 
 With regard to the availability of lesser sanctions, the 
District Court said that it had considered them “long and 
seriously,” but, ultimately, concluded that anything less than 
dismissal with prejudice would “condone flagrant violations 
of the most basic code of judicial propriety and honest 
dealing.”  It went on to say:  “[a] sanction other than 
dismissal would be insufficient to remedy the prejudice 
caused by Plaintiff’s intentional withholding of evidence and 
failure to provide appropriate notice to Defendant.”  Finally, 
it concluded that “there is no way around the fact that 
Plaintiff’s conduct has irreparably prejudiced Defendant.”  
There are numerous problems with this conclusion.   
 
 As we already have said, the record does not support a 
ruling that Bull intentionally withheld documents, nor that she 
was conducting herself dishonestly in this litigation.  
Moreover, any prejudice arising from UPS’s lack of access 
was remediable because UPS could have obtained the 
originals five days after the mistrial was declared.   
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 Second, before the District Court declared a mistrial, 
UPS originally argued against a mistrial and strongly 
advocated that the District Court remedy the situation by 
barring Bull from introducing the originals into evidence.14
 
  
Unlike Ware, where the exclusion of evidence necessitated a 
dismissal of the claim, the originals comprised only a portion 
of the evidence and UPS was—at least originally—content to 
proceed with trial using the copies of the notes that UPS had 
always had in its possession.    
 Finally, though the District Court rejected an adverse 
inference instruction as an appropriate remedy, it gave no 
solid reason for this.  In light of the fact that such an 
instruction would have bolstered the very portion of UPS’s 
case that it says suffered because it lacked the originals, we 
fail to see how an adverse inference—though itself a severe 
sanction—would not have been preferable to a dismissal with 
prejudice.  Given that dismissal with prejudice is a remedy of 
last resort, we are puzzled by the District Court’s decision.   
 
 For all of these reasons, we conclude that justification 
for the dismissal was overblown, and that sanctions other than 
                                              
14 UPS made the following statements at sidebar, following 
the discovery of the Farber originals.  “I’m fine with this jury.  
I don’t know that we need a mistrial, Your Honor.  But using 
this note is - - is clearly - - I don’t know what to do.”  ECF 
No. 56-4, 34:18-20.  “I still say, Judge, the appropriate 
remedy is to let the jury rely upon what UPS relied upon.”  Id. 
at 38:1-2.  “I think the appropriate remedy again is to allow 
the trial to proceed with the faxed versions of the notes.” Id. 
at 42:25-43:1. 
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dismissal with prejudice were available to adequately address 
any impacts suffered by UPS and the judicial process.  The 
District Court abused its discretion in concluding that 
dismissal with prejudice was the only appropriate remedy.   
 
G. 
 Finally, in assessing the sixth Poulis factor, the District 
Court concluded that the merits of Bull’s claim are “utterly 
lacking.”  Yet, the District Court appears to have 
misunderstood the subject of this portion of the analysis to be 
Bull’s defense against sanctions.  Poulis directs the District 
Court to examine the merits of the underlying claim:  which, 
in this case, would be Bull’s employment discrimination 
claim.  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70.  Moreover, even if the 
discrimination claim was judged to be meritless, Bull also 
advanced a second claim of workplace harassment that rested 
on a factual foundation that is distinct from the Farber notes.  
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in concluding that this factor weighed in 
favor of dismissal because it did not even address the merits 
of Bull’s claim.  
 
H. 
 To summarize, then, we conclude that two of the 
Poulis factors—personal responsibility and prejudice—weigh 
in favor of dismissal and four factors—dilatoriness, bad faith, 
availability of lesser sanctions, and the merits of the 
underlying claim—weigh against a dismissal.  We are left 
with the question of whether the District Court’s decision to 
dismiss the case with prejudice could be regarded as within 
its discretion when it is based primarily upon the prejudice 
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UPS suffered.  We conclude that it was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
 Earlier, we referenced a statement in dicta from 
Scarborough  in which we provided a list of the types of 
events that would support a ruling that a party’s prejudice 
alone should result in a dismissal.  In that portion of the 
opinion, we said: 
 
If there has been true prejudice to 
a party by its adversary’s failure 
to file a timely or adequate 
pleading, discovery response, or 
pretrial statement, that factor 
would bear substantial weight in 
support of a dismissal or default 
judgment.  Examples of such 
prejudice are the irretrievable loss 
of evidence, the inevitable 
dimming of witnesses' memories, 
or the excessive and possibly 
irremediable burdens or costs 
imposed on the opposing party. 
 
Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 876.  We acknowledge that this list 
is exemplary and not exhaustive.  Yet, it points to the scenario 
that we view as typical in a dismissal:  the non-responsible 
party’s case is severely impaired because it lacked the 
information that was not produced.  Although UPS had every 
right to receive the original Farber notes, there is nothing in 
the record to even suggest that it asked for them in discovery, 
or that its case was crippled because it lacked them.  
Moreover, UPS itself suggested early in the deliberations, that 
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sanctions short of mistrial (and therefore short of dismissal) 
were sufficient to address its prejudice.  We conclude from all 
of this that UPS’s prejudice is not sufficiently weighty to 
support the District Court’s sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice.   
 
 Moreover, since all sanctions originate from the realm 
of equity, we note that UPS’s representations to the District 
Court, and this Court, were less than candid.  It is fair to say 
that UPS expended no small effort in obfuscating to the 
District Court and this Court the details of its requests for the 
originals.  We acknowledge that it was the District Court’s 
responsibility to plumb the record to learn that UPS did not, 
as it repeatedly asserted, hound Bull for the originals.  Yet, 
UPS’s counsel crossed a line between effective advocacy and 
its duty as an officer of the court to accurately present the 
record, and in so doing it encouraged the District Court’s 
misunderstanding of the record.15
                                              
15 Based upon the following statement at sidebar during trial, 
the District Court plainly was unaware of the fact that UPS 
never asked Bull directly for the notes, and that there is no 
evidence that she was aware of any such request made to 
anyone else; yet, UPS never made any effort to correct the 
misunderstanding.  “So all they did was in my view what 
would be a reasonable request.  We find out she wouldn’t 
give those [Farber notes] to UPS, she wouldn’t give them to 
the people that are the union leaders that are supposed to be 
assisting her.  Then all discussions stop, a lawsuit starts, and 
then all of a sudden, after three years of discovery, in the third 
day of trial, we find out that these may exist but nobody ever 
looked for them.  Now come on. . . .This is egregious.”   ECF 
No. 56-4, 49:7-17. 
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 We conclude that, apart from the merits of the appeal, 
without the benefit of clean hands here, UPS should not be 
the beneficiary of a sanction that we are, under most 
circumstances, already loathe to affirm.    
 
IV. 
 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion in ordering that Bull be sanctioned 
by dismissing her case with prejudice.  Therefore, we will 
reverse the order of the District Court and remand the cause 
for a re-trial. 
